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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Scott Hansen asserts that the district court erred in denying him his fundamental
right to allocute during sentencing, and his case must be remanded for resentencing.
He further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court's
discretion because it is excessive.

Mr. Hansen also contends that the fact that the

district court relinquished its retained jurisdiction based on evidence of Mr. Hansen's
performance in less than 60 days in the rider program and without a hearing is patently
unreasonable and represents an abuse of discretion.

He further contends that the

district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the
additional information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Hansen's Idaho Criminal Rule

35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 1
The State claims that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Hansen's
assertion that the district court violated Mr. Hansen's due process rights, that because
Mr. Hansen did not object to the denial of his right to allocute it may not be considered
for the first time on appeal, and that Mr. Hansen cannot establish fundamental error
under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2008). This Reply Brief is necessary to address
the State's inaccurate claims pertaining to Mr. Hansen's assertion that he was denied
the right to allocute.

1 The arguments in support of Mr. Hansen's assertions that the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, relinquishing jurisdiction over him, and
denying his Rule 35 motion are adequately presented in his Appellant's Brief and are
not discussed further herein.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Hansen's Appellant's Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in

detail, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Hansen's rights of due process when it did not
allow him to allocute before he was sentenced?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Hansen following his plea of guilty to
statutory rape?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Hansen?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hansen's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the additional
information offered in his supporting affidavit?
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ARGUMENT

By Not Allowing Mr. Hansen To Make A Statement Of Allocution During Sentencing,
The District Court Violated Mr. Hansen's Due Process Rights

A.

Introduction
At sentencing, the district court advised Mr. Hansen as follows:
THE COURT:
Before I decide what to do in this case, Mr. Hansen, I'll afford
you an opportunity to make a statement on your own behalf or to present to me
any evidence or information in mitigation in an effort to lessen any punishment I
might otherwise impose. You can do that yourself, through your lawyer, through
witnesses, or any combination of the same.

(9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.)

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the

district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement: "I know that my client
does have a statement .... " (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)
Yet the district court failed to ask Mr. Hansen if he would like to make a
statement on his own behalf prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's sentence.

This was

error, and a denial of Mr. Hansen's right to due process.

B.

The Court Has Jurisdiction To Consider Mr. Hansen's Due Process Claim
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen's assertion of his right

to allocute is untimely under I.A.R. 14(a). The State's argument is without merit.
On September 19, 2011, Mr. Hansen was sentenced to two years fixed, plus six
years determinate, for a unified sentence of eight years.

(R., pp.62-63.) The district

court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.63.) On December 27, 2011, the district
court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing. (R., pp.69-70.) On February 7, 2012,
Mr. Hansen filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Relinquishing
Jurisdiction.

(R., pp.72-73.)

Mr. Hansen also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35
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(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion on February 9, 2012. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Hansen's Rule

35 motion was denied on February 15, 2012 without a hearing. (R., pp.91-95.)
Mr. Hansen is appealing his sentence. Mr. Hansen contends that the denial of
his right to allocute resulted in his sentence being imposed in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, and Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a); stated another way, that his sentence was
imposed in an illegal manner.
In State v. Gervasi, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that even in the absence of
an objection at sentencing, a defendant claiming a denial of the right of allocution may
raise the claim either in a timely filed Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence imposed
in an illegal manner, or for the first time in a timely filed appeal from the judgment and
sentence.

State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816, n.1 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus the denial

of the right to allocute is an issue with the sentence; it represents an illegal manner of
imposing a sentence, and the Court of Appeals in Gervasi acknowledged that there are
two avenues through which a defendant may seek to address this issue. See id. Here,
the State conceded that Mr. Hansen has timely appealed his sentence, "this Court has
jurisdiction to address Hansen's challenge to 'the sentence contained in the criminal
judgment'." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) As Mr. Hansen has timely appealed from his
sentence in this manner by the State's own admission, and this is a sentencing issue,
the Court has jurisdiction to determine this issue.

C.

Denial Of The Right To Allocution May Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen's failure to object to

the district court's denial of his right to allocute means that this Court is precluded from
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hearing the argument for the first time on appeal. The State's argument is without merit,
as it ignores the Court of Appeals' decision in Gervasi, a case that specifically dealt with
the denial of a defendant's right to allocute.
As a general rule, issues must be raised in the trial court in order to be
considered on appeal. State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454 (Ct. App. 1997). However,
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Gervasi concluded that denial of a defendant's right to
allocution may be raised for the first time on appeal, regardless of whether it was
objected to at sentencing. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. Thus, it was not necessary for
Mr. Hansen to object to the denial of his right to allocute at the time of his sentencing on
September 19, 2011, in order to preserve his right to appeal this issue.

D.

Mr. Hansen Has Shown Fundamental Error Under The Perry Standard
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen is unable to show

fundamental error by the district court in its denial of his right to allocute. The State's
argument is without merit.
The State claims that the right to allocute is not a constitutional right and,
therefore, the fundamental error standard articulated in Perry cannot be met.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Although the United States Supreme Court recognized
the importance of the right to allocute in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304
(1961), the following year it concluded in Hill v. United States, that a judge's failure to
ask a defendant if he had anything to say was not a constitutional error. Hill v. United

States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (holding that trial court's failure to ask defendant whether
he had anything to say was not constitutional error when defendant did not request an
opportunity to speak, did not suggest the district judge was uninformed as to relevant
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circumstances, and did not claim he would have had anything to say). Green and Hill
left open the question of whether a defendant who asks the court to speak has a right to
do so that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).

In

McGautha v. California, the United States Supreme Court assumed without deciding

that the Constitution does require the defendant be permitted to speak at sentencing if
he so requests, but the Court has thus far declined to determine whether or to what
extent due process requires that at criminal defendant wishing to present evidence or
argument at sentencing should be allowed to do so. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183,218-219 (1971) (vacated in part on other grounds by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S.
941 (1972)) (noting that the Supreme Court had not since Hill had an occasion to
address whether silencing a defendant who wished to speak rose to the level of a
constitutional violation).
However, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the right of allocution is a
constitutional, due process right.

See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.

1992) (holding that a defendant has been denied due process when his request to be
permitted to speak to the trial court before sentencing is denied); United States v.
Biagon, 510 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a] sentencing court does not

deny a defendant's constitutional right of allocution by declining a general request to
close a courtroom for sentencing") (emphasis added); United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d
1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Boardman that
allocution is a constitutional due process right). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[d]ue
process requires that a defendant who seeks to speak must be given such an
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opportunity before a sentence is imposed." United States v. Silva, 472 F.3d 683, 687
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1524).
In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by a prisoner.

957 F.2d 1523. The Ninth Circuit examined Hill, and

noted that it left open the question of whether a defendant who is affirmatively denied an
opportunity to speak during his sentencing hearing has a constitutionally guaranteed
right to do so. Id. 957 F.2d at 1527. In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit specifically held
that, when a defendant asks to speak, but is denied the opportunity, the right of
allocution was a right protected by the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. Id. 957 F.2d at 1530.
Not only does the Ninth Circuit recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment
dictates that a defendant receive a right of allocution,2 but Idaho law also finds a
constitutional basis for the right of allocution.

See State v. Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 958

(Ct. App. 1997).
In State v. Nez, the Court of Appeals recognized "the constitutional importance of
the right of allocution." 130 Idaho 950, 958 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the right to
allocution is not implicated in probation revocation proceedings because the sentence
has already been established). The Court of Appeals in Nez examined the decision by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boardman. The Court in Nez relied on the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Boardman:

"allocution is a right guaranteed by the due process

clause of the Constitution." Nez, 130 Idaho at 958. However, Nez was a case involving

2 The Fourth Circuit has also held that the denial of a defendant's request to allocute to
the sentencing court was a denial of due process. Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d
334 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied441 U.S. 966 (1979).
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the right to allocution at a probation revocation hearing, thus the Court in Nez found that
in cases of probation revocation hearings, I.C.R. 33 does not apply and, thus, the court
is not required to allow the defendant an opportunity to allocute. Id. 130 Idaho at 959.
The Court did note, in dicta, that the opportunity for allocution is the preferred practice in
all sentencing situations. Id. 130 Idaho at 958.
Although the Ninth Circuit limited its holding in Boardman to those cases in which
the defendant requested an opportunity to allocute, similarly, Mr. Hansen's counsel
affirmatively advised the district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared a statement and
planned to speak to the court on his own behalf. (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) Further, the
district court advised Mr. Hansen that it would "afford him an opportunity to make a
statement on [his] own behalf." (9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-16.) Additionally, the Idaho
Court of Appeals in GervasP noted that although a denial of allocution has not
affirmatively been held to constitute a due process denial under the United States
Constitution, "states are free to provide greater protections than those afforded at the
federal level."

Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816 (holding that the right to allocute is a

fundamental right) (citing State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 (2001) (analyzing whether the
Idaho Constitution provided greater protections than the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution)). Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that because the
Court noted that the State of Idaho provides greater protections for allocution than the
United States Constitution, that the right of allocution is a constitutional right under
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In support of this conclusion, the Court in

3 Although Gervasi and Nez were both decided pre-Perry, Perry did not overrule
allocution case law but merely clarified Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2008).
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Gervasi likened the duty of the court under Rule 33(a)(1) to allow an opportunity for
allocution to the requirement under Rule 11 that the trial court inform the defendant of
his or her right against compulsory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to
confront witnesses against himself.

Id.

The Court thusly indicated that the right to

allocute was synonymous with established constitutional rights, and implied that Idaho
recognized the right of allocution as a constitutional right.
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a), the due process clause of the United States
Constitution, and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, the district court was
required to allow Mr. Hansen an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf. As
discussed in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the district court that
Mr. Hansen did wish to make such a statement to the court. (See Appellant's Brief at p.
6.) The record is clear that Mr. Hansen was not asked by the district court at sentencing
whether he wished to make a statement. (See generally 9/19/11 Tr.)
Therefore, a remand for resentencing is warranted to allow him the opportunity to
speak on his own behalf.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing to allow Mr. Hansen his right of
allocution.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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